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ABSTRACT
Language: A Bridge or Barrier to Social Groups
by Adina S. Corke

Language acts as either a bridge or a barrier to social groups dependent upon the individual’s
effective use of a social group’s language. The individual uses the language of the group in order
to join the group and to be understood by the group. This suggests that language is behavioral in
part and can be treated as a form of social norms which delegate who is a part of the group and
who is not. By utilizing the language of the group effectively, an individual is able to join the
group. This group language may be temporary, and the dynamics of the group’s language can be
held only within specific situations, such as with inside jokes, or can be more lasting, such as the
language of a discourse. Examples of group language include the use of academic jargon in the
academy, key terms specific to an academic field, and the standardization of the English
language.

To formulate an interdisciplinary study of social epistemic rhetoric, this thesis looks at the
crossovers between two fields of study through a comparative analysis of social epistemic
rhetorical theory and psychological research concerning language production and perception, the
effect language has on understanding, and social mirroring processes that may be generalized to
language production. This rhetorical theory now grounded in psychological science calls for
experimental testing to find the limitations of group dynamics involving language.
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Introduction

In 2018, Randy the Australian, felt-faced, puppet comedian performed “Randy Writes a Novel”
in which the puppet attempts to read his recently finished novel manuscript called Walking to Sky
amid multiple tangents that represent Randy’s avoidance of any sort of feedback regarding his
novel (8:40). One such tangent is Randy’s description of his adventures when buying a bookshelf
from a man named Morgan. The main plotline of this sketch is not nearly as impressive as
Randy’s ability to play off socially established language codes that the audience is aware of and
that Randy is hyper-aware of. Randy spends a good portion of the sketch going over the text
message exchange of how he and Morgan met to pick up the bookshelf from Morgan’s home.
The sketch comes across like this:
I sent ... the text message: “Hello, I saw your bookshelf on Gumtree. Is it still
available?”
… Morgan’s response came through a couple of minutes later and simply read: “It
was my wife’s bookshelf.”
How do you respond to that? Aside from the fact that it doesn’t answer my fucking
question and that the past tense in that sentence unnerves me slightly ... I replied: “Is it
still available?”
He responded with the letter y, just a y. Is he asking me why I want to know if it’s
still available or is it a y for yes and he’s so in the throes of grief that he can’t manage the
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e and the s? I assumed it was a y for yes, so I responded: “Cool, I’ll take it. When’s a
good time to come and pick it up?”

No reply for 15 minutes ... and then when a reply actually does come through, I
realize he spent those 15 minutes crafting his response because it’s a fucking thesis. He
must have felt so bad about only using a single consonant in his previous text that he just
massively overcompensated with this one. Also, for some reason, he found that the use of
punctuation entirely unnecessary. So, it’s just one obscenely long sentence which reads:
“You must come pick up now I only have a short time here at house and also it
wide so bring van or trailer and also there upstair but I can help you carry downstair if
you come park out front walk up ring bell and I will help you carry it to trailer or van and
I only accept cash and if you do not come now I will sell it someone else”

... Now I am fascinated by Morgan and I simply must meet the man. So, I drive
over to his house—Oh, before I left, I sent a message that said, “Cool, I’ll be there in 10
minutes.” He replied, “Okay,” which just fascinated me more that he’ll use four letters to
spell a two-letter word and one letter to spell a three-letter word. Morgan is off the
fucking chain. And as I am driving over to his house, I am imagining what he is going to
be like ... Maybe, and I am really hoping this is the case, Morgan is just bat-shit crazy.
(49:54-53:05)
Randy’s text message exchange and the complaints he expresses over Morgan’s inconsistent use
of any sort of rules regarding the English language when texting a stranger accurately depict the
nature of language as a social norm while representing many of the nuances involved with this

2

topic as well. This project adopts an interdisciplinary approach to suggest that if assuming
language is social in nature, then it is a social behavior that dictates the parameters of social
groups. Language acts as either a bridge or a barrier to social groups dependent upon the
individual’s effective use of a social group’s language. This means language is more expansive
than just its standard form. There are codes within language that an individual must effectively
use to be a part of and maintain access to a social group. Research in both rhetorical studies and
psychological studies offer evidence of such an assertion.
In Randy’s sketch, Morgan’s failure to successfully use an appropriate code of language over
text messages with a stranger is not only unnerving but leads Randy to assume Morgan is
mentally unstable. The audience’s laughter in the video clip that comes before Randy’s
explanation about the use of past tense unnerving him in the first of Morgan’s texts is the
consequence of both the context of the story being told on a comedic platform and the audience
recognizing Morgan’s failure to use a correct code of language for communicating with a
stranger. As two strangers, both Randy and the audience assume that Morgan will respond to
Randy’s standard use of English with a standard use of English or his best approximation of that.
Instead, his use of language appears to have no rules or consistency to it. He provides one text
message with one letter that leaves Randy wondering what Morgan is trying to say. Another of
his text messages spells out “okay” entirely, so Morgan does not simply use the least number of
characters to communicate through text messages. Then he provides a long text with no
punctuation and grammatical errors which baffles Randy because no conclusion can be made
about Morgan’s rules regarding language communication.

This use of language has no code to it that Randy and the audience would use to categorize
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Morgan. Randy’s fascination with Morgan comes from a need to validate or correct his
categorization of Morgan as a type of person from a particular group. This need to categorize
Morgan comes from dissonance in Randy’s schemata about who would send text messages the
way Morgan does. Just as children categorize objects by name and characteristics, such as cat
versus dog, people categorize other people, and this is partially managed through people’s use of
language. Randy’s best explanation for Morgan’s speech is that he must not have a good handle
on the English language, or he must be crazy to utilize so many codes in one conversation with a
person he has never met.
Randy’s attempt at decoding Morgan’s “y” text message also represents the bottom-up top-down
processing model of communication between two people. Receiving the message and
recognizing that he has no idea what is meant by the letter “y” in the context is an example of
bottom-up processing. It is the process of receiving language as it is without using any outside
knowledge to decode what is trying to be communicated. However, Randy must use previous
knowledge regarding the English language and the context of the conversation to decode what
Morgan is trying to communicate. This cognitive process is called top-down processing (Samuel
1124). He comes up with two possibilities, that “y” is a letter meant to stand in for either why or
yes and uses the context of the conversation to determine that Morgan must realize why Randy is
texting him so yes is the more appropriate response given the context. This is representative of
bottom-up processing and top-down processing working together to allow communication to
occur.

This sort of function of social groups and cognitive processes regarding codified language exists
everywhere. It’s in comedy as seen with Randy’s sketch. It’s also in film, in mainstream culture,
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in the academy both between disciplines and within disciplines. Codified language is everywhere
as this project reveals, but the process to finding and proving its existence lies with an
interdisciplinary approach because the knowledge of language in both psychology and rhetoric
studies has remained relatively separate, alienated by departments focused on other questions of
concern. This project places a bridge between the two disciplines to allow room to explore this
idea.
Moving away from Randy’s example of language being used to navigate social situations, the
larger topic here is that the individual uses the language of the group in order to join the group
and to be understood by the group. This effectively creates a specific group language and
suggests language is behavioral and can be treated as a social norm. Such group language may be
temporary and held only within a specific situation such as with some memes or may become
more lasting when it enters a discourse such as terminology. Language as a social norm then
dictates who is a part of the group and who is not. By utilizing the language of the group
effectively, an individual is able to join the group. Such examples of group language include the
use of academic jargon in the academy, key terms specific to an academic field, and the
standardization of the English language.

For the extent of this project, language is defined as an innate, hard-wired cognitive process an
individual acquires through interaction with a social group (Thorne and Henley 545-546,
Feldman 230-231). This process is expressed as behavior, a social construct, and a system of
signs that are negotiated in social contexts. Ultimately, language comes to represent an
expression of reality which, in turn, informs and shapes reality so that it remains reflexive in
nature (Saussure 65-74, Lacan 11-13, Brown and Lenneberg 454). Through a comparative study
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of social epistemic rhetorical theory and psychological research concerning language production
and perception, the effect language has on understanding, and social mirroring processes that
may be generalized to language production, the information from the two fields cross over to
formulate an interdisciplinary theory of social epistemic rhetoric. This rhetorical theory when
grounded in empirical psychological science calls for experimental testing to find the limitations
of group dynamics involving language. This definition gives a solid theoretical foundation to
support the claims made about imitation being a key to understanding the relationship between
language and group dynamics. From here, this relationship is supported with both anecdotal
evidence and a case study of language and group dynamics dictating one another. Finally, a call
to action is made that states how perhaps interdisciplinary study can lend itself to fill in the holes
regarding knowledge of all types, but specifically concerning the effect language may have on
group dynamics.
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2

Language as a Social Behavior

To determine the relationship between the dynamics of language as an act of imitation in social
contexts, there is a need to define the social nature of language. Definition forms a firm theoretical
foundation that informs the project when comparing interdisciplinary knowledge regarding how
the group influences an individual’s language and vice versa. As such, an operational definition of
language is provided moving along the lines that language is a behavior, a social act, and that it is
socially constructed. Such a definition provides an opportunity for the audience and the writer of
this project to come to an understanding about what it means when language is used within this
text and what implications that may have with regards to this project as a whole. After defining
language, this project departs from rhetorical theory and past psychological research to compare
the critical theory concerning mimesis with the psychological theory concerning mirroring as a
means to discuss the role of language concerning imitation of behavior, imitation of reality, and
imitation of language. This section of the project lays out the theoretical framework employed
throughout the rest of the project while the social nature of language is outlined further.

2.1

Language as a Social Act

Language is the bridge between reality and expression of that reality which an individual performs.
That is to say, an individual with language is either a receiver of language or a producer of language
at one point in the conversation and this receiving or producing is considered performance of
language (Brown and Lenneberg 454). This type of communication requires a sociality even when
the producer of language is performing for oneself since the self comes to embody both social
roles as listener and producer.
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This project accepts rhetorician Ferdinand de Saussure’s adherence to semiotics as the philosophy
behind the elements that make up language. Saussure criticizes definitions of language that
presume the elements of language are made up of a list of words that stand in for concepts in
reality, “a naming-process only” as Saussure phrases such a notion (65). Language is problematic
for Saussure because it assumes the idea behind a word, or rather “signifier,” that represents reality
does not exist before the sign comes into being (66). To Saussure, language consists of a series of
signifiers or sound-images that represent objects and ideas found in reality (signs) or mental
concepts that have come out of reality (signified) (67). The signifiers are initially arbitrary in nature
since the sound of the word is not necessarily similar to the object in reality. The social agreement
between humans that the sound represents the object in reality leads to the arbitrary nature of the
signifiers. However, Saussure writes: “[Only] the associations sanctioned by the language appear
to us to conform to reality, and we disregard whatever others might be imagined” (67). The
arbitrary nature of signifiers shapes the perception of reality so that reality is perceived through a
lens of signs or language. Speaking to the arbitrary nature of language with regards to its
representation of reality, Saussure asserts that language is inherited always from a preceding
generation with no known origin necessarily. Attempting to name an origin is fruitless according
to Saussure who suggests that all we should concern ourselves with are “existing idioms” (72).
However, this does not mean one should not recognize the influence the element of inheritance
has upon language. Saussure also calls language a “social formation” influenced by participants”
(74). Since language is inherited and evolving out of a social formation’s past, language is not only
a social formation, but a social formation influenced by the present social group and the past social
groups. James Berlin addresses the social nature of language as well:
[Since] language is a social phenomenon that is a product of a particular historical moment,
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our notions of the observing self, the communities in which the self functions, and the very
structures of the material world are social constructions—all specific to a particular time
and culture. These social constructions are thus inscribed in the very language we are given
to inhabit in responding to our experience. (“Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class”
488)
Participating in language is then partaking in a social act with people from the individual’s present
culture and past culture.
However, Saussure’s description of language is problematic. He assumes all sound-images must
include sound. Saussure attends to the auditory and vocal components of language and the physical
structure of words in a visual context, but he dismisses language that is made up of gestures
commonly referred to as sign language. This project has no need to exclude sign language as a
language since it remains a social construct in which participating individuals are producing
language created from arbitrary but socially agreed-upon gestures that stand in for objects,
thoughts, and ideas in reality. Alternatively, sign language is perhaps a better example of
Saussure’s semiology. It has a grammatical structure that Saussure requires of any defined
language. The gestures are arbitrary signifiers in nature but come to shape the reality of those who
learn to use the language. For instance, girl is gestured as a thumb swiping down the cheek. This
gesture is taught to learners of American Sign Language as representative of blush on a girl’s cheek
or rosy cheeks. The sign itself is arbitrary but teaching the gesture this way shapes the
representation of what it means to sign girl for American Sign Language learners based on all the
meanings that come inherently with the gesture or signifier. The limited meanings of signifiers
erase the perception of the arbitrary nature of signifiers by shaping human perception of reality
around language.
9

Given that Saussure’s definition of language includes defining language as a social construct
where signifiers are socially agreed upon to represent objects in reality, an important question to
ask is whether the group repeats the language utilized by the individual or the individual repeats
the language formed by the group. Where do these sentences come from initially if the group has
any influence over the individual? Since the individual speaks the language of their social group,
there is an influence on the individual coming from the meanings of the specific language the
individual utilizes while the group continues to maintain or question meanings of specific
language across time. The individual does not produce language within a vacuum then, so how
unique can the individual’s sentences be with outside influences? Given Saussure’s assertion that
“the individual does not have the power to change a sign in any way once it has become
established in the linguistic community,” the individual then has very little agency over the
language he or she utilizes (69). However, with mention of this, we are getting ahead of
ourselves here. As James Berlin writes in his criticisms, “more of this in a moment” (“Rhetoric
and Ideology in the Writing Class” 488).

2.2

Language as a Behavior

Saussure’s work came at a time when behaviorism was coming into being. Behaviorism became
increasingly prevalent across the first three-quarters of the twentieth century and rose in popularity
starting in the 1940s (Thorne and Henley 16). It was during this behaviorist movement when
psychologists predicted they could generalize conclusions regarding the extent of experimental
behavior research to unlimited aspects of human behavior, including language acquisition. For
instance, behaviorist B.F. Skinner defined language in terms of verbal learning. A child is
reinforced for communicating using language and learns what to say to receive rewards while
avoiding words and phrases that bring on punishment (Thorne and Henley 384, Feldman 230).
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Simply suggesting that language is a signifier to signified matching process people learn to become
fluent in a language emphasizes the arbitrary nature of signs and generalizes the arguments made
by behaviorists at the time.
However, cognitive psychologists disagreed with Skinner’s pure behaviorist notion of language.
For instance, George Miller’s book The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits
on Our Capacity for Processing Information explains that the mind’s short-term memory has the
capacity to remember only so many pieces of information at once. This is an important discovery
because it bridged human communication with mathematical theory and it discredited the pure
behaviorist notion of learning language since it was deemed improbable for a human to remember
and recall all of the signs that make up a language without some sort of biological mechanism that
would aid this process of learning language (Thorne and Henley 545-546). Noam Chomsky
conducted research that influenced many psychologists and psychologists, including Miller. His
definition of language is the beginning of a definition of language in the field of psychology today.
Chomsky’s notoriety began with him blasting Skinner for his behaviorist view on language in 1959
by saying there was a “poverty-of-stimulus” in Skinner’s argument (Thorne and Henley 543).
Instead, Chomsky theorized the need for a language acquisition device (LAD) in the brain that
would allow for language acquisition. Chomsky believed humans were born with brain structures
specialized for learning a language which his later research supports (Thorne and Henley 543-544,
Feldman 230). Eric Lenneberg concluded from his study that during critical periods of
development, the brain has structures primed for learning language (Purves, Augustine,
Fitzpatrick, et al. n.p.). This suggests language acquisition is made possible through a combination
of biological structures and an environment that supports the exposure and practice of language.
Such a notion is called the interactionist approach by child psychologists (Feldman 230-231).
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Without exposure to language, no language can be acquired. With language exposure, the language
acquired is that which the person has been exposed to. Therefore, the brain does not just have
knowledge of language before exposure occurs, but exposure without the cranial structures will
not lead to language acquisition either.
The cases of Genie and Victor, while unfortunate stories, are exceptional examples of a failure to
acquire fluency in language. Genie was thirteen when she was found and rescued by social
services. This girl was subjected to at least ten years of solitary isolation, for the most part, along
with other known and unknown horrors. Professionals working Genie’s case inferred from her
early behavior that this girl was beaten whenever she vocalized at all which conditioned her to
remain silent even after she was removed from the home. Genie’s case reminded psychologists,
psychiatrists, and doctors of Victor’s case in 1800 during the Age of Enlightenment. Victor was
about twelve years old when he was found after emerging from a forest. He came at an interesting
time as archeologists, doctors, and other professionals were discussing humanism or rather what
elements of human nature differentiate humans from the rest of the animal world. Known as the
“Wild Child” and having the movie The Wild Child made about his participation in Jean Itard’s
rehabilitation program, Victor’s case greatly influenced Genie’s case as it was used for the
groundwork in her rehabilitation program and the tests professionals ran for the purposes of
learning what role nurture has in human behavior (NOVA “Secrets of the Wild Child”).
Genie’s and Victor’s cases are of particular interest when it comes to their use of language. Both
children showed remarkable use of language given their circumstances once they were placed in a
social environment with humans willing to pay attention to them. By the time Genie was receiving
help with language, she was fourteen years old. She showed an interest in learning the names of
objects around her and seemed dissatisfied when she confronted the limitations of the English
12

language such as blue being the sign for all shades of blue instead of having a sign for each shade
of blue. While in foster care for a second time, Genie’s conversations with her foster mother were
recorded:
MARILYN RIGLER: Do you remember what it was like when you lived at home? What
were you sitting on when you ate the cereal?
GENIE: In the pot.
MARILYN RIGLER: In the potty chair.
GENIE: In the potty chair.
MARILYN RIGLER: Where did you stay when you lived at home? Where did you live?
Where did you sleep?
GENIE: Potty chair.
MARILYN RIGLER: You slept in the potty chair?
GENIE: Mmm-hmm. Potty chair. (NOVA “Secrets of the Wild Child”)
This communication with Genie and her responses show a mimicking behavior of language. She
repeats the phrase her foster mother gives her instead of continuing with her original phrase for
the purposes of being understood. Her use of language represents more of Saussure’s sign-tosignifier matching model and Skinner’s behaviorist model rather than a biological model.
Susan Curtiss documents her findings concerning Genie’s development in her book, Genie:
A Psycholinguistic Study of a Modern-Day Wild Child:
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She does not simply memorize the phonetic form of words spoken to her and mimic
that pronunciation in her speech, sans analysis, sans phonological organization. Genie’s
language, like that of normal, includes a set of phonological rules, rules that organize and
classify the sounds and sequences of her language, rules that are often motivated by
universal phonological principles. What is most important is that Genie’s speech is the
output of a system of rules that are extracted from her input data … Her phonological
competence is not transparent. It underlies the system of rules that produces her phonetic
performance, and is distinct from it. (92)

Curtiss is asserting that Genie, while unable to perform at the level of a typically functioning
child her age with regards to language, showed that she was capable of comprehending and
utilizing some of the rules of the English language she was exposed to by those around her. By
listening to the language directed at her, she internalized what was said, analyzed it, and
responded to it in her own way following the rules of the language she was exposed to and
creating her own rules which dictate her style of communication. Unfortunately, neither Genie or
Victor came to speak any language fluently. While they could both respond appropriately to
commands and communicate messages in return, it was not in line with the appropriate
grammatical structures of the language. Curtiss’ work on Genie’s case led to the conclusion that
critical periods were a facet of language acquisition. Genie’s cranial structures even showed
atrophy in her left hemisphere where activity occurs during language comprehension and
production suggesting that the loss of exposure to language during her critical period led to the
loss of cognitive activity in the language functioning part of her brain (Curtiss, Fromkin, and
Krashen 23-25). Both Victor’s case study and especially Genie’s case study support the
interactionist approach to language development since it was observed that both biological
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structures and social exposure are necessary for language development. Unfortunately, with the
loss of interest in the child patients, the intensity of their rehabilitation programs was lessened in
each case and the patients’ use of language regressed to that of a naming process where actions
and nouns could be identified but not particularly manipulated to express novel ideas.

2.3

Bottom-up/Top-down Processing

The biological functions of language production and language perception are important to
consider when dismissing either a behaviorist approach or a purely biological approach to
language acquisition. As such, it is necessary to understand the processes that occur in the brain
that allow for communication.

Within the field of psychology, language production and perception are viewed as two processes
occurring simultaneously. One process is called top-down processing where previous knowledge
is used to interpret language and to produce it. The other process is called bottom-up processing
where the language itself is perceived and then interpreted. This model for language perception
was formed by Arthur Samuel in 1981. Samuel used Richard Warren’s 1970 experiment on the
phonemic restoration effect in which it was discovered that the human brain restores improper
phonemes or sounds with more appropriate sounds if a word is mispronounced. Samuel describes
this effect as a process where one reaches into their lexicon to find the word that has both the
heard portion of the word and a suitable replacement for the missing portion of the word (1124).
An example might be that a person hears I saw a —uck swimming at the park today and
unconsciously fills in the missing information to perceive hearing I saw a duck swimming at the
park today. Previous information about the language from the lexicon and context of the
situation allows the listener to fill in an appropriate word instead of a word like truck or puck.
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This also makes social interactions easier for both the listener and the speaker.
Samuel’s experiment found that context played a major role in how participants interpreted the
sounds they heard, forming them into specific words. Nativist, behaviorist, and interactionist
approaches regarding language along with social epistemic theory about language connect across
the academic fields through this top-down/bottom-up processing model and through the idea that
language is a socially constructed device to express thought. The process of perception leads to
insight about the expected responses from an audience negotiating the subject matter within a
discourse. Without recognizing the nature of language perception, the theory of language’s social
nature becomes conjecture.
The crossover between psychological theory and rhetoric leads one to David Bartholomae’s
“Inventing the University” where he claims that writers must be aware of their audiences: “A
writer has to ‘build bridges’ between his point of view and his readers. He has to anticipate and
acknowledge his readers' assumptions and biases” (9). Being able to assume the role of the
reader as a writer is a similar process to that of a speaker assuming the role of his listener to
communicate effectively. Using the top-down process, the speaker analyzes the connotations of
the words he is about to utilize to guess how he will be perceived by the listener. The writer goes
through the same process but is perhaps more aware of this process than the speaker who does
this automatically.

2.4

Schemata

Understanding schemes or schemata help to understand part of the top-down processing model
of language. According to Jean Piaget’s theory of children’s cognitive development stages,
schemes are used to understand and define the world and behavior. While these schemes do not
16

necessarily require language, they are shaped by it eventually. As a baby learns about the world
around it, characteristics of objects are categorized into schemes which language helps to define
later through a process of either assimilation (adding to a current scheme) or accommodation
(rewriting the boundaries of a scheme) (Feldman 28). For example, a child can learn the
difference between a cat and a dog based on the characteristics of the animals that are expressed
with language, such as cats have short ears and noses with tails that flick about while dogs have
longer ears and snouts with tails that whack things. When a cat without a tail or with bent ears is
encountered and does not fit the description of a cat or a dog but it is called a cat nonetheless, the
child adapts their scheme to match the assertion made by the group. In such a case, usually, the
child changes the parameters of what it means to be a cat accommodating the scheme.
It may help to think of schemata as the brain’s internal Venn diagram creation center or
dictionary. The brain categorizes objects in the world surrounding the body and maps the
crossovers of these objects by defining what the object is through what it is not. This idea relates
to structuralism where signifiers represent the signified through a binary structure. Terms like hot
and cold only exist in relation to one another based on this binary structure. However, when
something is encountered that has features akin to both hot and cold, the schema for what is hot
and what is cold must adapt or a new sign must be assigned to the experience such as with cold
burn or freezer burn. While this seems simple enough, developing children are constantly
adapting or learning new signs for their experiences, and the issue of signs becomes more
complex as more schemata begin to cross over into one another their boundaries blurring. In such
cases as gender continuums, even adults must adapt their schemata and learn new signs that
manage the dissonance created from the binary structure the human brain utilizes.
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Sir Frederic Bartlett viewed schemata in a way that relates to Saussure’s description of signs,
signified, and signifiers. He understood schemata as “a mental structure that organizes and
summarizes a large number of related experiences. The schemata (schema is singular) allow us
to combine many particular experiences—for example, our interactions with dogs—into one
composite representation, our dog schema” (Thorne and Henley 535). Schemata are the signified
of signifiers which allow signs to come so easily to humans for communication. The signified
includes all the signifiers. What can be inferred from Bartlett’s definition of schemata is that they
create the boundaries of what sign can be assigned to a signifier. For instance, there are many
different types of dogs in the world that we have experiences with (signifiers), but a schema
would have a mental concept of one signified which has one sign (dog). This is topdown/bottom-up processing at work.

The assumption behind this theory of language comprehension is that it would be too taxing on
the brain to have to translate each word coming from the speaker and heard by the listener.
Instead of translating and interpreting each word heard, the brain makes presumptions about
what is being said. If someone says “present” followed by “candles” most listeners would
assume the speaker is referring to someone’s birthday. This assumption is a form of top-down
processing. This processing makes it easier for the listener’s brain to translate or comprehend
what the speaker is saying, especially if some words are not heard and interpreted correctly.
Cultural and linguistic elements condition the brain to make assumptions about what words mean
and what words are associated with others.

18

3

Language is Imitation

Keeping in mind that the definition of language for the purposes of this project includes viewing
language as a representative system of arbitrary signs that name mental conceptions of reality and
that it is a social construct and a social behavior that human biology is primed to participate in and
navigate, this definition is managed through imitation. Arbitrary signs, though arbitrary, act to
imitate reality while remaining separate from reality. They act as the bridge within which
communication occurs to express experiences in reality and are thus representative and imitative
in nature. Saussure and Berlin also state that a language is weighted with cultural history regarding
the signs chosen to represent the signified, but language is also evolving all the time. Such a
process comes from the repeated use of signs suggesting that this social construct is repetitive and
once again imitative in nature. There are many different signs to express the imitative nature of
language such as resemblance, repetition, mimesis, and mirroring. All these terms lead to the same
notion that to imitate language is to participate in a social behavior. Much the same as other social
behaviors that are mimicked such as shaking someone’s hand before and after an interview or
standing when the instructor enters the classroom, language is also a social behavior that creates
and defines the boundaries of a group. Access to the group is gained through successful and
effective use of this lingual social behavior which is most often managed through repetition

3.1

Mimesis and Mirroring

The boundaries between experimental psychology and rhetoric can be blurred so often that they
should be entwined with each other on subjects such as research regarding composition in the
classroom and social epistemic rhetoric. However, the boundaries between these disciplines have
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yet to intersect frequently enough. This is not to say that rhetoricians and theorists have ignored
psychologist’s work in matters of interest or vice versa. It is to say that connections between
information in both fields of study have not been addressed thoroughly enough. One such
example comes with a comparison between Aristotle’s framing of mimesis as a key term in
critical studies and psychology’s use of mirroring as a term describing social behavior.

While Aristotle leaves the definition of mimesis open to interpretation, its literal translation is to
interpret. However, mimesis should not be seen as a product but rather as a process of imitation
(Aristotle 46). Mimesis is not directly mentioned within Bartholomae’s essay, “Inventing the
University,” but the concept is present. Bartholomae locates the role of imitation and mimicry
from students within the university when they are asked to join the discourse without having any
real authority to do so. He describes this process:

[Basic writers and students as a whole], in effect, have to assume privilege without
having any. And since students assume privilege by locating themselves within the
discourse of a particular community—within a set of specifically acceptable gestures and
commonplaces—learning, at least as it is defined in the liberal arts curriculum, becomes
more a matter of imitation or parody than a matter of invention and discovery. (10-11)
While Bartholomae’s statement can have only a limited application to the students he regards in
this particular discussion concerning composition pedagogy, this imitation of language can be
generalized when witnessed as taking place outside of the classroom between writers as well.

This tool of imitation that Bartholomae notes as relied upon by students is also employed by
theorists specifically. Judith Butler recognizes this imitation of language in the first chapter of

20

her book Bodies that Matter. While Butler’s main purpose in writing this book is to expose the
gendered nature of language, she manages to both practice and expose the imitation of language.
Butler’s first chapter covers the philosophers whose work utilizes gendered language even when
attempting to untangle gender from language. She takes note of the idea of “resemblance” as
used by Plato, deconstructs its meaning when Plato uses it, and then reuses the word to confront
the gendered nature of her own thesis statement and conclusions (Butler 43). By stating what
those before her have said, Butler can ground her authority with the knowledge she rehearses on
the page. She is either quoting, paraphrasing, or commenting on the work of those who have
come before her imbuing her with authority. This practice is an imitation itself and emphasizes a
writing style expected from anyone attempting to join feminist critical theory discourse in an
English department of the academy. Once she has defined resemblance, Butler uses the
definition that has been born from her deconstruction process to make the word work for her.
The similarity between Butler’s work and that of a student is in the imitation process. Both
Butler and the student Bartholomae describes employ successful or less successful written
imitation of those in authority. This project is not necessarily concerned with the specifics of a
given topic with regards to language as much as it is concerned with the mimicking phenomena
of language found within all levels of the academy. However, examples such as Butler’s use of
“resemblance” in her chapter that successfully joins the discourse remain relevant to this topic
since it exists as a strong example of what the imitation process of language looks like at one of
the highest levels within the academy.

No discussion of mirrors would be complete without mention of Jacques Lacan. He suggests that
language is the reflection of reality to the individual. If the individual can only see the
fragmented self in reality or the whole self in a reflection, a mirror, then the self is never truly
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seen as whole, even when looking at a reflection. The individual is only capable of seeing the
reflection as whole, but that reflection is not the self (11-13). This reflection, however, allows the
individual to analyze the self as a whole. Language functions much the same way concerning the
reflection of reality. It may speak of an object but language itself is only a reflection of the
object. The signifiers can never be the object itself. Furthermore, each individual experiences
reality filtered through their perceptions formed by an innumerable quantity of factors including
social cultural norms, experiences, language’s effect on the individual, and so on. These realities
are unique to each individual since no two people can live exactly the same life. Even if identical
twins were to walk together through life having the same experiences and genetic
predispositions, they would always be experiencing the other twin’s life about half a foot to the
right or left because no two objects can occupy the same space at the same time. Therefore, no
perception of reality is the same or rather all perceptions of reality are unique to the individual.
This is an assumption that must be made for this project to continue. Language then becomes the
bridge between two individuals attempting to convey their experiences of reality with one
another.

Mirroring, when utilized in a psychological context, is defined as typically unconscious social
imitation whereby the person with less authority is more likely to mimic the behavior of the
person with more authority in a given situation. Albert Bandura called for a new social learning
model that filled in the holes left by behaviorists who asserted that all behavior was learned
consciously or unconsciously through operant and classical conditioning. These styles of
learning models are not efficient by themselves to explain the massive repertoire of behaviors
exhibited by humans. Therefore, mimicry or mirroring of behaviors seen by an individual’s
social group is one explanation for the expansive behaviors within which humans participate.
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Such an idea is a model of social learning (Bandura 213). To support his claim of the social
learning model, Bandura presents his observational findings which catalog social learning
through imitation. In one example, he describes the vocational training in the textile industry in
Guatemala. No instructions are provided, and no questions are answered but the student observes
the trainer, then takes over the cotton-textile machine and reproduces what she has seen from the
trainer almost perfectly. In Cantelenese culture, Bandura observes the behavior of a female child
who has been provided miniature domestic items that her mother frequently uses. This little girl
imitates her mother’s behaviors without direction (Bandura 213-214). Describing American
culture, Bandura shows the prevalence of imitation:
[American parents…] supply [their children] with a varied array of play materials-toy
kitchen ensembles, dolls with complete nursery equipment and wardrobes, cooking
utensils, food-mix sets, and other junior-size homemaker kits-that serve much the same
purpose. In games utilizing such stimulus material, children frequently reproduce the
entire parental role behavior including the appropriate mannerisms, voice inflections, and
attitudes which the parents have never directly attempted to teach. (214-215)

According to behaviorists, this learning of behavior is called imitation while personality
psychologists call this process of imitating behavior identification (Bandura 215).
Bandura’s landmark research on social learning theory and imitation took place in 1961 where he
experimented with young children between the ages of three and five years to see how
witnessing aggression affects behavior. A cohort brought the child participant into a room full of
toys and a Bobo Doll. The adult then aggressively abused the Bobo Doll even using a hammer to
beat the doll. Then the children were left to their own devices and imitated the adult’s behavior
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just as it had been performed. Some children even improvised when abusing the Bobo Doll using
other toys besides the hammer as weapons. When the genders of the adult performer and the
child participant were the same, the imitation of the adult’s behavior was more accurate as well.
Similar results were found when the study moved to show the child participants recordings of
such abuse of the Bobo Doll and just aggression in general. The children imitated the behavior
they witnessed (Bandura 219-242, BBC Four “The Brain: A Secret History…”).
This study was not only a valuable study for Bandura’s career, but it opened the doors for social
learning theory and a growing concern of access to violence through television. Numerous
studies have come from Bandura’s discovery of imitation; however, language development has
been neglected within this context. Preschool children increase their vocabulary at an alarmingly
fast rate so that by age six, the average child has about a 14,000-word vocabulary. This is
accomplished through fast-mapping, a term used in the field of psychology to describe the
associations young children make between signs and signifiers that they have only briefly
encountered (Feldman 225). Both ideas of imitation and fast mapping stand apart within the field
of psychology but connecting them could have explanatory power. Fast-mapping occurs because
a child encounters a sign within a context and thus associates the signifier with the sign. It’s a
social action. Another human who speaks the same language the child is learning must present
the sign to the child’s environment. While the presentation does not have to be direct, it still must
be there. What is seen with fast-mapping then is the child’s ability to imitate language in order to
improve social communication. Likewise, perhaps some version of fast-mapping occurs with
behaviors beyond the utilization of language through this exposure. Fast-mapping is a version of
imitation, but it is not described as such, yet. Just as Butler defines resemblance as imitation and
Bandura gives meaning to mirroring through his social learning through imitation theory, so is
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fast-mapping a type of imitation, mirroring, and mimesis. These are all terms across two
disciplines that suggest language is a social behavior and a process of entering a group. They just
have not been generalized to this degree until now.

Mirroring is an important social skill usually necessary for maintaining typical functioning in
human societies. Social behavior is based on cultural norms that, when successfully used, allow
people to be accepted into the in-group. This sort of behavior also shows respect to the individual
being imitated. As the cliché goes, imitation is the greatest form of flattery. Social mimicry
typically happens unconsciously, as seen with Bandura’s 1961 research, unless we become aware
of it and decide to use imitation to our advantage as Butler does. It is the phenomena to explain
why we know the rules in society, but we cannot tell you where we heard them or who told them
to us. It is the reason we know the right way to sit in a chair and physically read this text, but we
also know in what situations we can bend these rules to sit in a chair the wrong way—whatever
that may be—and so on.

Those who cannot mirror social behavior successfully are determined to have social
developmental problems and are typically labeled with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) for
which treatment centers around social behavior stress management training (“Autism Spectrum
Disorder” World Health Organization, “Treatment for Autism Spectrum Disorder” Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention). Similar to the way children with ASD are trained to fit in with
society and expected to function typically eventually, basic writing students are categorized as
having dysfunctional writing in an academic setting which means they are deemed atypical in
their ability to mimic the discourse. In consequence, they are sorted into classrooms in which
schools expect the students will receive training for this deficiency. While this last example
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seems hyperbolic and extreme, it does make apparent the emphasis society places on an ability to
mimic, mirror, resemble, or imitate. From the way we sit to the way we write and what we write
about down to the very words we use to discuss topics, we are mimicking an understanding of
society, especially within the academy, that favors repetitive and imitative social behaviors.

Mimesis and mirroring intersect as ideas across disciplines when language enters the picture. Just
as it is seen when Bartholomae discusses imitation as the tool students use to join a discourse,
and just as it is seen when Butler appropriates Plato’s word choice in his philosophy to situate
both the mechanism of “resembling” and the word “resemblance” as tools academics use to add
to a discourse, mirroring in terms of language is imitation and by proxy, mimesis (42-43). By
imitating language either as a means for social interaction or as a means to command authority
(or attempt to command it when the writer is unsuccessful), the imitation of language is then
mimetic at a deeper level. The mirroring of reality through language makes language a
representation of reality and thus, mimetic. To imitate the imitation is to still mimic reality by
proxy and is then mimetic as well.
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4

Language is Codified in Social
Settings

Social epistemic rhetoric is described in relation to the topic proposed in this body of work as a
means to discuss the role of codes used both within the academy and outside of the academy.
Seeing that humans can and do mimic behavior, that language is a social behavior and construct,
now it can be determined how language acts as a gatekeeper for access to such groups. What are
the rules? How does the individual learn them, and more importantly, how does the individual
use these rules to effectively navigate social settings in a beneficial manner to the individual?
Language is codified and this code can be separate from a dialect or the differences between
entire languages. Groups determine the code which may be cultural in nature, regional,
academic, informal pop culture, and so on. The possibilities are endless. These codes can exist
between just two people who have managed to create their own version of a group dynamic
through language such as calling each other a nickname, or they can exist within an entire field
of study such as the medical field. In any case, the codified language acts as a barrier
determining the in-group and the out-group. While it is one factor that plays a role in group
dynamics, it is the factor of interest discussed within this project.

4.1

Social Epistemic Rhetoric

Berlin discusses rhetorical theory as ideology that privileges a specific emphasis or prescription
of ideology. Berlin comments on Göran Therborn’s concept of ideology in rhetorical theory:
“Conceived from the perspective of rhetoric, ideology provides the language to define the subject
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(the self), other subjects, the material world, and the relation of all of these to each other.
Ideology is thus inscribed in language practices, entering all features of our experience”
(“Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class” 479). However, one must ask how ideology can
exist without language? The two seem to exist and create each other not separately but
simultaneously. Ideology, specifically complex ideology formed after centuries of study and
communication across texts, cannot be expressed without language. Without language, Berlin’s
criticism would not exist to tell the reader that language defines the immaterial and the material
world that is formed through ideology so then can the ideology truly exist? Can it exist for the
individual? This said, ideology places importance upon the evolution of language when new
terms are coined. Therefore, ideology influences language by creating new terminology and
defining old terminology again and again while language mediates ideology between people.
Regarding language with this lens then places the audience in a hermeneutic circle Berlin
describes as social epistemic rhetoric.
To simplify a summary of this circular logic Berlin presents, it’s understanding that the material
world and the consciousness of the individual affect each other and are mediated by social
constructs that alternatively also affect both the material world and consciousness of the
individual (“Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class” 489). As seen through both conjecture
and empirical studies conducted by experimental psychologists, language affects perception of
the material world (signifiers) and has been defined as a social construct. Therefore, if language
replaces the term “social construct” in Berlin’s description of a hermeneutic circle, then language
is the mediating factor that influences an individual’s understanding of their material world and
consciousness (“Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class” 489). This relationship is also
reflexive in nature since language is mediated through experience and consciousness. It would
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not be socially constructed if there was not a need between at least two individuals to
communicate conscious thought and experiences. The need to be understood dictates that both
parties communicating, the language producer and the language receiver, must have access to the
same language so they can be understood. As Saussure would put it, the sign is arbitrary, but it is
a socially agreed-upon symbol of a signified.

Berlin defines social epistemic rhetoric and its parts with the following:

For social-epistemic rhetoric, the real is located in a relationship that involves the
dialectical interaction of the observer, the discourse community (social group) in which
the observer is functioning, and the material conditions of existence. Knowledge is never
found in any one of these but can only be posited as a product of the dialectic in which all
three come together . . . Most important, this dialectic is grounded in language: the
observer, the discourse community, and the material conditions of existence are all verbal
constructs. This does not mean that the three do not exist apart from language: they do.
This does mean that we cannot talk and write about them—indeed, we cannot know
them—apart from language. (“Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class” 488)
He goes into further depth regarding social epistemic rhetoric using Kenneth Burke’s description
of it as language that is symbolic action negotiated socially to form and continue discourse: “The
subject negotiates and resists codes rather than simply accommodating them. . . [If] the subject is
a construct signifying practices, so are the material conditions to which the subject responds”
(Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures 79). This acknowledgment of the social agreement that must be
made to have discourse mirrors Stuart Hall’s 1980 discussion about the role of the audience as
accommodating, resistant, or negotiable. Such a successful negotiation would need mastery of
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the codes/signifiers used by the subject initially. As such, the language used in the discourse
comes to have a set of signifiers specific to the topic being discussed.

As an example of this seen across professions and represented in film, The Exorcist released in
1973 manages to represent how codified language is treated among those within the medical
community and the religious community. In this film, the audience is expected to believe that a
young girl, Regan, has had her body possessed by a demon and witnesses a mother struggle to do
what is best for her child when attempting to treat the affliction. Initially, the mother takes her
daughter to several doctors and a psychiatrist before seeking out a Catholic priest under the
direction of a team of doctors. In a meeting with one of these doctors towards the beginning of
her journey to return her daughter to her normal and healthy state, the doctor explains what he
believes to be the cause of Regan’s strange behavior:

Chris: Doc, what could make her jump off the bed like that?
Dr. Tanney: There’s a perfectly rational explanation. Technically speaking, pathological
states can induce abnormal strength and accelerated motor performance. More
commonly, a ninety-pound woman sees her child pinned under the wheel of a truck, runs
out and lifts the wheel half a foot off the ground. You’ve heard the story. Same thing
here. (The Exorcist)
To describe Regan’s behavior as nothing more than an adrenaline rush, the doctor uses words
unique to the field of medicine such as “pathological” and “motor performance” (The Exorcist).
To describe what mainstream culture would refer to as an act of motherly love, he sterilizes the
hypothetical scenario to fit within the audience’s expectations of how a doctor speaks. The film
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even puts boundaries between doctors and psychiatrists through this codified language when Dr.
Tanney responds to the mother’s description of her daughter as “some kind of psycho, like a split
personality” when he says: “There haven’t been more than a hundred authenticated cases of socalled dual of split personality, Mrs. McNeil. Now I know the temptation to leap to psychiatry,
but any reasonable psychiatrist would exhaust the somatic possibilities first” (The Exorcist). This
dismissal of a mental illness diagnosis represents the privileging of a “somatic” or biological
diagnosis that can be found through scientific methods and treated accordingly. When this
approach fails, the Clinical Director leads the discussion with Regan’s mother to tell her their
diagnosis of Regan:

It looks like a type of disorder that you never see anymore except among primitive
cultures. We call it somnambuliform possession. Quite frankly, we don’t know much
about it except it starts with some conflict or guilt that eventually leads to the patient’s
delusion that his body’s been invaded by an alien intelligence; a spirit if you will. In
times gone by, the entity possessing the victim is supposed to be a so-called demon, or
devil. (The Exorcist)
With the use of the word “so-called” and the preface of “somnambuliform” to the term
possession, this doctor is able to medicalize an unexplained phenomenon. He is performing the
language of the social group he wishes to remain within to the point that he risks being
misunderstood, something Regan’s mother shows when she calls this jargon “bullshit” (The
Exorcist). Beyond incarceration in an asylum, the Clinical Director defines his use of the term
“exorcism” as both “an outside chance of a cure” and “a stylized ritual in which rabbis and
priests try to drive out the so-called invading spirit” (The Exorcist). The Clinical Director’s use

31

of the term “so-called” once again and the success of exorcisms he credits to the placebo effect
where the power of the patient’s belief that caused the illness also cures the illness represents his
imitation of the group’s language and belief system which allows him to maintain his identity as
a man of medicine to everyone in the room. The exorcism is not called a rite or a ceremony but a
“stylized ritual” which sounds more like something an anthropologist might say but a man of
science would certainly use such language that trivializes the practice to maintain his access to a
group that does not support such beliefs.

When signifiers of a language have their meanings repurposed to function mainly within a
specific context, it creates an in-group, or a social group separate from those who speak the
language employed. For instance, a rhetorical criticism written in the English language and
utilizing signifiers specific to the field of English speaks only to those who understand the
meanings implied by the signifiers. Even then, these signifiers are operationally defined within a
larger academic context but only by using an academic jargon that alienates those who are
unable to participate in the communication style. Anyone fluent in English can technically read
the criticism. It is written in English and the reader is fluent in the language. However, any
meanings taken away from the criticism may be limited based on the reader’s ability to
assimilate to the social group that can make meanings from the text.

Language has its own subsections, subcultures or something described more akin to dialects
perhaps, especially within the academy but also outside of it. The language employed in research
papers from an author conducting research in a composition classroom is structured differently
from research papers coming from an author conducting biological research. Certain words are
never used, certain sentence structures and verb tenses are avoided, and the repetition of analysis
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in the conclusion may be heavier in one paper over another based on the expectations of the
social group for which the author is performing. While the language used in each paper is
classified as the same, the social group the author is writing to and attempting to participate with
is dictated by the style of language employed. According to the operational definition of
language presented at the beginning of this project, the language between academic communities
or social groups does not change as long as the same words and general syntax structure are
used. Why is it then that the language produced from different departments in the academy that
technically all use the same language is so alien to those outside of the social group for which the
presented language is intended?

Language is codified for specific social settings which creates in-groups and out-groups of those
who can successfully function within the social group’s agreed linguistic negotiations. This
language negotiated by the social group is not a new language, but it takes the same skill to codeswitch between the styles of communication within one’s own language and the language of the
desired in-group. Social epistemic rhetoric is then the theoretical background that allows for the
leap to describe the process of code-switching in relation to language, especially within the
academy.

4.2

Code-Switching and Codified Language

When discussing the audience-awareness pedagogy Bartholomae defines, he suggests that
language from a student to a teacher within the university must come from a position of authority
and privilege. Students are asked to assume a position of authority over a topic to join a specific
discourse. In doing so, the discourse the student attempts to join can shape the tone and
presentation of language of the student when the student mimics the language of the discourse.
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For instance, a student’s report on the biological structures of a butterfly’s wings may show an
attempt on the student’s part to mimic language utilized in the biology community and perhaps,
more specifically, the entomology community while assuming authority over the subject matter
by using active voice and avoiding statements that could be questioned.

The discourse becomes a code of speaking, and while it cannot be objectively called another
language based on the definition of language given by psychologists and linguists, moving from
one discourse to another requires code-switching. This phenomenon of code-switching within
language cannot be fixed by calling formal language and informal language different languages
when accepting Saussure’s definition of language as a series of signifiers representing the
signified using a set of phonemes. The same signifiers are being used with similar syntax though
some words themselves may have their definitions changed enough to bend the rules of the
language’s standardized syntax.

This can be seen when scholars discuss the other and othering. A noun in the English language
has been shifted to a verb and the presence of the before other signals to the reader that this other
is defined separately from the general definition of other. As the use of the other has become
more widespread across academic fields, other is now becoming acceptable by itself without the
requirement of a the present. Therefore, to refer to Noam Chomsky’s definition of fluency as the
ability to create an infinite number of unique sentences within a strict grammatical structure
appropriate to the language utilized (13), mastery of a language would rather suggest that the
student is able to code-switch between discourses and outside of discourses for numerous social
situations.

34

4.3

An Anecdote and a Case Study of Codified Language

On a personal note, I witnessed issues with code-switching in my students while teaching a seminar
in rhetoric class titled “Writing About Otherness.” My students were encouraged to use the
language of their preferred discoursal community while discussing otherness within their written
assignments. For the most part, my students’ works suffered mainly from slips into an informal
writing style not befitting of an academic paper. However, when providing feedback to my
students, I found myself struggling over whether to correct their use of the term the other
grammatically. Some students confused the term’s importance and conflated it with another or an
other. Other students always capitalized it. Few manipulated it into a verb but those that did copied
my use of the term othering in class. It frustrated me to say the least. I did not know whether to
remove points from their papers out of the five percent of their scores that went towards grammar
or if I should teach a lesson about how to correctly use the term. Then it hit me that I, myself, did
not know of any specific rules regarding this term. My use of the word came out of a mimicry of
my professor’s performances with the term. This word rarely showed up in dictionaries within the
context of the term’s theoretical definition and what I managed to find in dictionaries was not
standardized. Even in the same entry regarding the other, it was both capitalized and not capitalized
as a noun and not mentioned as a verb at all:
9. (often initial capital letter) the other,
a. a group or member of a group that is perceived as different, foreign, strange, etc.:
Prejudice comes from fear of the other.
b. a person or thing that is the counterpart of someone or something else:
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the role of the Other in the development of self. (“Other” Dictionary.com)
Seeing as I had little more authority over the term than my students, I spent time during a class
session asking them how they would prefer to structure the term grammatically. Without revealing
where the suggestions came from, I provided options for my students given what I had seen in
their writing and how I would structure the term in my own writing. As a class, we voted on which
grammatical structures we all preferred deciding that capitalizing the Other made the term more
distinct and using othering was an appropriate format for using the term as a verb. In the span of
a semester, my students were able to actively dictate the codes of language within their
class/discoursal community which helped me as a grader and them as writers. The code gave them
a better understanding of the term as well. I noticed they utilized it more appropriately and
managed to practice avoiding other and another in their writings for my class when these terms
did not refer to the Other.
Following my experience as an instructor democratically creating codes for my students to discuss
a niche topic, I found myself on a panel at Chapman University’s Interfaith Council which held a
Community Forum with Orange County Interfaith Network on April 11, 2019. The title of the
forum series was “The More You Know, the Less You Fear” and the theme was defined as “How
the ‘I’ Treats the ‘Other’” (see Appendix A). Within the forum, eight Chapman students spoke on
their personal interactions with the other through their religious practices. These students of
varying ages and from various academic programs independently wrote out short speeches
responding to the prompt: “Describe a time when you were the ‘I’ and interacted with the ‘other’.”
They then read these speeches as panelists to an audience of members of the community, peers
from the student body, and members of the Orange County Interfaith Network (see Appendix B).
Their varied areas of study across the academy informed these students’ uses of the term the other
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but their syntactical use of the term made for an interesting case study.
One student speaker from the Baha’i faith placed “the other” in quotations in the written version
of her speech the first time she used the term: “It’s my strongest belief that love for ‘the other’ will
be accomplished through a mixture of two things: empathy and equity.” However, while her
speech does not show avoidance of the term, she uses this term only once. Since she only uses the
term once as “the other,” it cannot be concluded that she is uncomfortable appropriating it to fit
the syntactical structure of her writing, but her sparse use of the word might suggest this is the
case.
Another speaker from the Islamic tradition used the term the Other without quotations but
capitalized the noun of the term instead. However, while she was waiting to speak, she rewrote her
sentence with the term in it so that it was no longer capitalized but within quotation marks. Her
original sentence reads: By converting to Islam, I didn’t become the Other…” The rewritten
sentence reads: “In one sense, I became ‘the other’ by being a religious minority.” Her speech only
uses this term twice, but it is interesting that as the last person on the panel to speak, she rewrote
one of her sentences that had the term in it without keeping the same grammatical structure she
had initially.
The student speaker representing the agnostic tradition appropriated the other as her own term by
hyphenating the noun to create a verb form of the term, “other-ed.” She too uses this term twice,
but she plays with the term more. While both the Baha’i student speaker and the Muslim student
speaker only use the term “the other” or “the Other” as a noun in their speeches, the agnostic
student speaker initially turns the noun into a hyphenated verb. She writes: “Indeed, I was ‘othered’ by everyone, and I didn’t fit in.” Then she comes back to the term as a noun by the end of her
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speech placing both “I” and “other” in quotations to suggest a structural comparability as a
representation of the terms’ relatability to one another. She writes: “Above all, it shows me that
the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ are all part of the same chain of being that modestly tries to make sense of
our world.” However, this grammatical structure mirrors both the prompt she was provided with
and the subject of the panel printed on the program, something she had access to before writing
her speech.
My own speech, since I was a participant on the panel for this event, utilized the other as a term
without emphasizing its presence within my speech. Interestingly enough, I did not use the other
as a noun but rather appropriated it into one of two verbs: “othering” and “othered.” I write: “I
didn’t realize how othered this ward remained until I attended the baptism of my friend at another
building whose congregation was made up of bilingual members. The surprise I felt when seeing
Spanish speakers mingling with English speakers in the church forced me to confront my
participation in othering Spanish speakers within the Mormon faith.” Instead of using the term the
other, I replaced its presence with “discrimination” writing: “Participants in the Pagan community
have often sought out a haven from the discrimination they encountered in Christianity.”
The Jewish student speaker does not place quotation marks around the term, nor does he capitalize
it. He writes: “The question, how the I treats the other, has been a subject of my life I have
genuinely been afraid to confront.” The term is treated just as another word. This panelist does not
even place quotation marks around the “I” which refers to the prompt. He also writes: “However,
I am not egotistical enough to think that I truly treat everyone the same, that I have never acted
like or thought of someone else as other than myself.” This use of the other as a term is vague in
this sentence since it acts as both a term to describe those treated as less than but also as a word to
describe something separate from the self. There is no attempt to emphasize the term through
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grammar as a means to suggest that this other is the other that is part of a larger discussion
happening even beyond the discourse of the forum. This Jewish student speaker also writes: “This
gives me comfort, knowing that I have somewhere to look when it comes to finding ways I can
use what I have to help others . . .” In this statement, while the term the other may have been
intended by the speaker, no syntactical clues are provided to bring forth this intention. Therefore,
when hearing the use of other in this sentence, “others” and the other are no different without
having been provided the context of the prompt. Alternatively, he writes: “I feel like, instinctively,
we try to avoid thinking about things that make us look less than ideal, likely to the extent that we
have a hard time admitting we do see some as ‘other.’” This is the only place where other has
quotation marks around it which may show a lack of continuity in the grammatical structure this
panelist employs, or that this “other” is the only true reference to the other made by this panelist.
The Disciples of Christ student speaker uses the term as other with no “the” in front of the term at
times. This leads to a back and forth between definitions as he uses “other” both to refer to the
other in the context of discrimination and other as in someone separate from the self. He writes:
I was raised in an environment where we did our best to ensure [that] there was no other
and that we were all just an us, a people of God… Everywhere I went other Christians were
telling me about [God’s] plan… That was the other for me, and that anger would consume
me and just destroy me from the inside…The problem was that that form of faith did not
work for me because I lived a privileged life with minimal roadblocks and living where I
did constantly seeing the suffering of others… After struggling with that for years, I was
finally able to live up to my teachings, journey together with the other and love them
despite our differences.
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He provides no grammatical emphasis in the written text of the speech and no consistency in
differentiating others from the other; however, judging by the level of inconsistent grammatical
errors throughout the entirety of the written speech, this document does not seem to concern itself
with a reading audience. Rather, since the document was designed to be read to an audience that
listens, the syntactical structures are not representative of the spoken emphasis present in the
speaker’s speech. Yet, the term the other is compared with “us,” a unifying idea that no other
speaker manages to describe in a word. The other as a term is described as discrimination, racism,
classism, and so on. The alternative speakers all suggested an abolishment of othering practices,
but no speaker beside the Doctrines of Christ student was able to compare the other with what he
felt was its binary perhaps, “us.” This comparison is not held up by the end of his speech however
when he refers to those othered as “them” and to himself as “I.” This does adhere to the prompt
though.
The last speaker identified her religion as interfaith. Her appropriation of the term the other is most
interesting. In her speech, she writes: “I have felt ‘other’-ized in many settings of faith…” Beyond
this one line in her speech, she had used the word “other” only as a reference to those separate
from the self when every “other” came with an “each” before it. She writes: “Everything is related
to each other…We impact each other in ways that we can’t even perceive…We need to teach each
other with common language.” This last sentence is extraordinarily ironic within the context of
this project and within the forum. Here, a panelist is providing a call to action by suggesting
conversations be performed in a common language. Yet, as seen by this case study, a common
language is not as easy to hold onto as one might think. While this interfaith speaker was referring
to problems in translation between languages, the case study provides an example of problems in
understanding between academic communities. No set definition of the other was provided to these
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speakers before they wrote their speeches. As such, a religious studies/psychology double major,
interfaith student appropriated the term into the verb “otherized,” while a history, Doctrines of
Christ student made little distinction between the other and “other.” Some students capitalized the
noun to emphasize its distinction. Other students placed it in quotations. If one were to ask these
student speakers where the term the other has come from and what it means today, their definitions
would be similar but perhaps lacking in knowledge of the historical context that comes with the
term. Regardless of which academic discipline or which religious community these students come
from, they are not all English majors who have taken a class that went over Edward Said’s theories
discussed in his book, Orientalism, and were then taught how the term is utilized within that
discourse. Even as a student who has had this experience and as an instructor teaching students
this lesson, I could not manage to find a standardized code for how the term is to be used within
any discourse. These panelists do not have all the same knowledge base with regards to this term
and it shows by their different versions of appropriation with this term as a verb or a noun. They
seem to have the ability to recognize what othering looks like but their command of a definition
of the term is not as concrete as seen by their use of the term across their speeches. However, their
role as panelists and the personal nature of their speeches forces them to command authority over
the topic at hand.
This case study mirrors almost exactly what Bartholomae discusses in his essay “The Idea of a
University,” regarding student composition when attempting to enter discourse. These interfaith
student speakers are attempting to integrate themselves within a discourse without having
authority. The speeches these students present are personal and suggest a command over the
personal narratives they describe. However, their use of the term the other commonly used in
academic language shows they do not have authority within the discourse regarding othering since
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their language does not mesh with that of the discoursal community. These students from separate
academic communities are attempting to utilize a term specific to a few academic communities all
while the term is evolving to expand beyond the scope of these communities. This case study then
represents an example of a failure to code-switch as well as the evolution of a term outside of its
initial discoursal community. Students unaware of the code regarding the other is a part of use the
term differently from each other and, in some cases, differently from those in the academic
community from which the term was derived. However, the forum the panelists were a part of is a
microcosm of the interfaith community attempting to integrate the idea of the other into its
discourse. The speeches provided by the panelists then represent the steps involved toward
evolving the term to exist beyond its initial discoursal community. If audience members took the
appropriated version of the term “’other’-ized” and used it within the forum when asking questions
or discussing the panels with each other, they would be understood. However, utilizing this
invented verb outside of the group that involved the speakers and their audience may lead to issues
of translation. The speakers misappropriated a code from one academic community but created
their own coded language within the context of a separate social group.
Alternatively, within the text of this thesis are also examples of code-switching between discourses
as well. For instance, utilize is a verb used within the discourse of psychology that is not often
employed in rhetorical discourse. While proposing this project’s topic and its interdisciplinary
nature, it was made known that utilize is not a rhetoric friendly word when discussing language,
but it is the appropriate word in a psychological discourse. Language producer and language
receiver are appropriate terms in the field of psychology but not as welcomed in a discussion
involving rhetoric. Beyond discipline-specific terms used in this thesis such as semiology and fastmapping, the basic vocabulary that makes up this text is balanced between the disciplines, though
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the English language dictates most of the words used are often synonyms.
Another example of both mirroring and code-switching can be seen with the use of academics’
citations of each other to back up claims. It is a form of codifying the arguments academics make
while imitating a format that is a part of the discipline the academic is a part of. Quotations can
spawn new words or definitions of words utilized in a paper or lead to the fusion of words that also
create new terms that may or may not remain within the discourse. Academics also create their
own in-group by referencing which group of academics they are calling upon to inform their
argument and by critiquing specific terms these academics use. For example, Berlin uses
Therborn’s definition of ideology to inform his use of the word ideology, which creates a
foundation for Berlin to craft an operational definition of the term. This operational definition
allows for clarity since words themselves have different connotations to the individual reader that
a dictionary definition will not mediate well enough as seen with the problematic operational
definition of language defined in this project. By creating operational definitions or supporting
what operational definitions already exist, the language produced in particular contexts is codified
by the language producer and all who respond.
Codified language is not the same principle of language’s evolution, but the two are related and
cross boundaries with one another. Take the example mentioned above regarding other. The
operational definition placed upon the other is an example of codified language. Those with
knowledge of the code can speak to this definition, question it, use the word to imply multiple
ideas, discuss the prevalence of the idea the word represents now within multiple contexts, and so
on. The possibilities are possibly endless. However, the use of this term makes sense only to those
who have access to the operational definition of the term. Those who have knowledge of the origin
of the definition of the term have an even greater authority when using the word and discussing it
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within specific contexts. Therefore, the other is a term used by an in-group of people privy to the
definition and is thus an example of codified language.
This use of the word other also represents the evolution of language, but separately. A word’s
meaning and use have been expanded to hold a separate meaning within specific contexts. When
there is an expansion of the context within which this new meaning of the word can be utilized,
the word evolves. Codifying language adds to the already existing definition of terms within the
language that expands the language and changes connotations and uses of specific words within
the language. Therefore, codifying language can evolve language, but evolving language is not
necessarily codifying language. The two are related processes but not mutually exclusive with one
another necessarily.
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5

Concluding Statements

The purpose of this project is to bridge the gap in information left by group dynamics which exist
within the academy, specifically regarding the involvement of language in social group dynamics.
Psychologists have both conjecture and studies with empirical results that support some of the
ideas rhetoricians are proposing. For instance, theories of immitation in both fields of study are
partially supported with Bandura’s research regarding social modeling. However, without access
to the theories posed by these rhetoricians, the field of psycholinguistics (a subfield of psychology)
fall short on experiments that could be designed and run since often times previous research in the
field of psychology is the research heavily considered and expanded upon. Similarly, studies of
rhetoric run through English departments are asking questions that can be answered by working
together with other academic departments who unknowingly or perhaps knowingly have the same
questions.
The question here is what the limitations are concerning the role of language in group dynamics.
Using research from the field of psychology and rhetorical theory from the field of English, this
project presents the two together to show how they connect. However, no experiment has been
conducted in either discipline that reveals empirical evidence suggesting that language is one
element that manages group dynamics. It has been theorized by rhetoricians and anecdotes suggest
that this is the case; however, research conducted by psychologists regarding group dynamics
focuses on the imitation of behaviors not including language. The conclusions reached in both
fields do not have empirical evidence from experimentation that can be generalized appropriately
to prove this topic’s claim directly. Similarly, to suggest that language is codified within social

45

situations uses esoteric language found in both fields but it is an idea left unproven. It is only a
theory and without interdisciplinary cooperation, the limitations of this theory may never truly be
understood.
Therefore, this project, while suggesting that the effective use of coded language can grant access
to groups, serves as an example that speaks to a larger issue of the segregation between disciplines
within the academy and even outside the academy. The major discussion of this project could not
have been made without interdisciplinary cooperation. The sharing of information between groups,
in the case of this topic specifically, has not performed as readily as it can which has possibly
stunted the expansion of knowledge. There are holes in knowledge concerning the relationship
between codified language and group dynamics that can be filled with collaboration between the
disciplines. Studies used as support and examples of the relationships between information found
within mainstream culture and just two fields of study in the academy that needed to be provided
to make the claim in this project are from as early as 1800 with the case of Victor, the original
Wild Child in the field of psychology, and progress to as late as April of 2019 with anecdotal
recognition of this proposed theory at work at the Interfaith Panel. Recognizing there are barriers
and bridges built from codified language used by groups not only to understand the ideas of one
another within the group but to solidify identity in relation to the group allows for a new
worldview, one that is focused on inclusion and awareness perhaps.
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